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Monsters in Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives∗
Brian Rabern
brian.rabern@gmail.com
The Australian National University
(Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies)
Kaplan (1989a) insists that natural languages do not contain displacing devices which operate
on character—such displacing devices are called monsters. This thesis has recently faced
various empirical challenges (e.g. Schlenker (2003) and Anand and Nevins (2004)). In this
note, the thesis is challenged on grounds of a more theoretical nature. It is argued that
the standard compositional semantics of variable binding employs monstrous operations.
As a dramatic first example, Kaplan’s formal language, the Logic of Demonstratives (LD),
is shown to contain monsters. For similar reasons, the orthodox lambda-calculus-based
semantics for variable binding is argued to be monstrous. This technical point promises
to provide some far-reaching implications for our understanding of semantic theory and
content. The theoretical upshot of the discussion is at least threefold: (i) the Kaplanian
thesis that “directly referential” terms are not shiftable/bindable is unmotivated, (ii) since
monsters operate on something distinct from the assertoric content of their operands, we must
distinguish ingredient sense from assertoric content (cf. Dummett (1973), Evans (1979) and
Stanley (1997)), and (iii) since the case of variable binding provides a paradigm of semantic
shift that differs from the other types, it is plausible to think that indexicals—which are
standardly treated by means of the assignment function—might undergo the same kind of
shift.
1 Monsters
The semantic framework in Kaplan (1989a) is standard and familiar, as is the distinction
between two kinds of meaning that it proposes, the character and the content of an ex-
pression. Kaplan insists that these two aspects of meaning play very different roles in the
semantic theory. The content is the information asserted by means of a particular utterance.
Whereas, the character of an expression encodes what any utterance of the expression would
have as content. This is modeled as a function from various contextual parameters to the
∗For helpful comments on earlier drafts thanks to David Chalmers, John Cusbert, Karen Lewis, Daniel
Nolan, Jim Pryor, Landon Rabern, Paolo Santorio, Wolfgang Schwarz, Clas Weber, and an anonymous
referee.
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information content the expression has relative to those parameters. For example, different
utterances of ‘I am a sick man’ communicate different information depending, crucially, on
who happens to be uttering the sentence. But this is not the only difference in roles played
by the two aspects of meaning. Kaplanian content is also nominated as a privileged level of
semantic representation: contents are understood to be the entities over which the compo-
sition rules should be defined—whereas character is understood to do its work prior to the
compositional process. This commitment is encoded in Kaplan’s prohibition of monsters.1
My liberality with respect to operators on content, i.e., intensional operators...does
not extend to operators which attempt to operate on character...Operators like
‘In some contexts it is true that’, which attempt to meddle with character, I call
monsters. I claim that none can be expressed in English...And such operators
could not be added to it. (Kaplan (1989a), p. 520–521)2
This can be made more precise. The domain of the character function is a set C. Each c ∈ C
is a tuple of content generating parameters—these tuples are standardly called “contexts of
utterance”. Character functions map contexts of utterance to contents. The content of an
expression is itself a function from a set G to extensions. Each i ∈ G is also a tuple of
parameters, usually understood to be world-time pairs—these are called “circumstances of
evaluation”. Assigning a character to an expression amounts to assigning that expression an
extension relative to all contexts c and circumstances i. I will use the standard notation JαKc,i,
which should be read as the extension of α at context c and circumstance i. Abstracting over
the circumstance coordinate λi.JαKc,i gives the content of α at a context c and abstracting
over both the circumstance and the context coordinates λc, i.JαKc,i gives the character of α.
Kaplan’s ban on monsters amounts to the claim that there are no operators in the language
that take characters as argument.3 Under the assumption that the relevant constructions
have a compositional semantics this can be defined as follows.
1Note that this is not to say that the ban on monsters is incompatible with the semantics being compo-
sitional at the level of character. After all, if the semantics is compositional at the level of content, then
it is thereby compositional at the level of character. One could in principle provide composition rules that
are defined over characters and then supply a context to get the contents (and extensions) of the complex
expressions. (See Westerst˚ahl (forthcoming) for a detailed analysis of how compositionality at different se-
mantic levels relate to each other.) The question rather is this: assuming that the language in question
is compositional at the level of character, is it also compositional at the level of content? In this way the
monster prohibition and the compositionality of character and content are connected via the following bi-
conditional: A semantics is monstrous iff (i) it is compositional at the level of character and (ii) it fails
to be compositional at the level of content—or as Westerst˚ahl (forthcoming) puts it “Monsters destroy the
compositionality of content”.
2Although Kaplan does not provide an explicit argument against the existence of monsters, I think a fair
rational reconstruction of his reasoning proceeds as follows: (i) the semantic composition rules are defined
over the information contents associated with expressions, (ii) the information (or assertoric) content of an
expression is never equal to the character-level value of an expression, (iii) thus, the language fails to contain
monstrous operations.
3Again we should more precisely say that the monster ban requires that there not be any operators in the
language that must take characters as argument. The qualification of “must” should be included because
many non-character operators can be transformed into “equivalent” ones that takes characters as argument,
e.g. any truth-functional connective can be given a semantics in terms of functions on characters.
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Monster prohibition. There is no sentential operator Σ of a natural language L such thatJΣφKc,i is defined and fails to be a function of λi.JφKc,i.4
Assuming again that the relevant constructions are compositional the following provides a
definition of a monstrous sentential operator.
Definition 1. A sentential operator Σ is a monster in L if and only if there is a sentence
φ in L such that JΣφKc,i is defined and JΣφKc,i 6= JΣKc,i(λi.JφKc,i).
In this sense, then, the monster ban prohibits “meddling with characters”. Since the param-
eter c is identified with a sequence of “content generating parameters” we can also provide
a more intuitive (but equivalent assuming compositionality holds) definition in terms of
“shifting” the content generating parameter c (i.e. “context shifting”).
Definition 2. A sentential operator Σ is a monster in L if and only if in the semantic
evaluation of a sentence Σφ, φ is evaluated with respect to a sequence of content generating
parameters c′ that is different from the sequence of content generating parameters c with
respect to which Σφ is evaluated.
2 Tarskian semantics for quantifiers
All the sentential operators of the propositional calculus are truth-functional. This is not so
with the predicate calculus—the quantifiers are not truth-functional. Tarski (1936) showed
how to recursively assign sentences values of a different kind for the quantifiers to operate
on. The relevant values are functions from variable assignments to truth-values.5 Before re-
hearsing the Tarskian semantics in terms of assignments let’s rehearse the syntax of predicate
logic.
For the syntax we have a set of variables, {xi}i∈N, a set of predicates {F ni }i,n∈N (where
F ni is an n-place predicate), the truth-functional connectives ∧ and ¬ and the quantifier ∀.
For these we have the following formation rules:
• If pi is an n-place predicate and α1, . . . , αn are variables, then pi(α1, . . . , αn) is a formula.
4The monster prohibition as stated rules out all hyperintensional operators, which is well-motivated since
Kaplan glosses his monster prohibition as the thesis that “all operators that can be given an English reading
are at most intensional” (Kaplan (1989a), p. 502n27). The definition would need to be modified if one
wanted to allow for purported non-monstrous hyperintensional operators (e.g. quotational operators). The
definitions are also simplified by limiting the focus to monstrous sentential operators. But in full generality
a monster could be of any syntactic category. In general form the monster prohibition is the prohibition
of the following composition rule (in the style of Heim and Kratzer (1998)): Monstrous functional
application. If α is a branching node and {β, γ} the set of its daughters, then for any context c and
circumstance i: if JβKc,i is a function whose domain contains λc, i.JγKc,i, then JαKc,i = JβKc,i(λc, i.JγKc,i).
5Actually, Tarski (1936) formulated it in terms of functions from sequences to individuals. Assignments
are functions from variables to individuals, whereas Tarski’s sequences were just sequences of individuals—
and variables were indexed to positions in sequences. There is clearly no essential difference here. I use
the formulation in terms of assignments for continuity with Kaplan (1989a) and contemporary semantic
frameworks, e.g. Heim and Kratzer (1998).
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• If φ and ψ are formulae, then φ ∧ ψ and ¬φ are formulae.
• If φ is a formula and α is a variable, then ∀αφ is a formula.
• Nothing else is a formula.
Now for the semantics we have a structure {U, I}, where U is the set of individuals, and
I is an interpretation function (which assigns sets of ordered tuples of individuals to the
predicates). For our purposes, the important machinery is that of an “assignment function”,
which assigns values to the variables. An assignment function g is a function from variables
to individuals, g : {xi}i∈N → U . We write g[α := i] to denote the assignment function that
is just like g except that it assigns to the variable α individual i. Given this setup we can
give the Tarskian semantics for predicate logic by recursively defining 1 (or “truth”) relative
to an assignment function as follows:6
• For a variable α, JαKg = g(α).
• For n-place predicate pi and variables α1, . . . , αn, Jpi(α1, . . . , αn)Kg = 1 iff (Jα1Kg, . . . , JαnKg) ∈
I(pi).
• For a formula φ, J¬φKg = 1 iff JφKg = 0.
• For formulae φ and ψ, Jφ ∧ ψKg = 1 iff JφKg = 1 and JψKg = 1.
• For formula φ and variable α, J∀αφKg = 1 iff for all i ∈ U , JφKg[α:=i] = 1.
The important thing to note here is what the semantic value of the quantifier is. The last
clause says that ‘∀αφ’ is 1 at an assignment g just in case for all assignments g′, ‘φ’ is 1
at g′, where for all i ∈ U each g′ is just like g except that it assigns i to the variable α.
The quantifier, then, looks to the profile across assignments of its embedded formula and
gives 1 if the embedded formula is 1 across all assignments and gives 0 otherwise. Assuming
that the compositional semantics of such quantified constructions proceeds via functional
application, the lexical entry for ‘∀α’ is as follows:7
• J∀αKg = λp〈γ,t〉.∏
i∈U
p(g[α := i])
Thus, on the standard Tarskian semantics for predicate logic, quantifiers are assignment-
shifting sentential operators.8
6This actually gives Tarski’s definition of “satisfaction by a sequence”, Tarski reserves the term “truth”
for formulae that are satisfied by all sequences.
7Where
∏
is the integer product of the sequence of truth-values (i.e. the sequence of 0s and 1s) and p is
a function from assignments to truth-values, i.e. of type 〈γ, t〉.
8This is also evident in the the algebraization of the semantics of predicate logic in terms of cylindrical
algebra.
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3 The monstrous quantifiers of LD
You know where this is headed: Kaplan’s formal language the Logic of Demonstratives (LD)
contains monsters. This is due to the fact that LD employs assignment-shifting quantifiers
and the fact that assignment-shifters meddle with character functions. To demonstrate
this I will focus only on a fragment of Kaplan’s LD that has to do with variables and
quantification.9
The fragment of LD we are concerned with has the same syntax as predicate logic. The
semantics is slightly more complicated but for reasons that do not concern quantification. For
the semantics of LD we have a structure {C,W, T, U, I}, where C is the set of contexts, W is
the set of worlds, T is the set of times, U is the set of individuals, and I is an interpretation
function (which gives extensions to predicates at circumstances j ∈ T ×W ). The extensions
of expressions are given relative to a point 〈c, g, t, w〉 where c ∈ C, t ∈ T , w ∈ W and
g is an assignment function. Given this setup the semantics is also essentially the same as
predicate logic, except the points at which we recursively define 1 (or “truth”) are expanded,
i.e.〈c, g, t, w〉. To see this consider the Kaplanian clause for the universal quantifier.
• For formula φ and α ∈ V , J∀αφKc,g,t,w = 1 iff for all i ∈ U , JφKc,g[α:=i],t,w = 1.
The extra parameters in the point of reference are, of course, to handle indexicals and modal
and temporal operators, which we are currently ignoring.10
Kaplan maintains that variables are the paradigms of directly referential terms (and when
he is in a Russellian mood he expresses this by saying that a “variable’s first and only meaning
is its value”) (see Kaplan (1989a), p. 484 and Kaplan (1989b), pp. 571-573). In the formal
part of “Demonstratives” he gives an explicit account of the content of variables and open
formulae. Here he introduces the notation {α}c,g to mean “the content of α in the context
c under the assignment g” and tells us that the content of a variable is as follows (Kaplan
(1989a), p. 546).
• If α is a variable, then {α}c,g = that function which assigns to each t ∈ T , w ∈ W ,JαKc,g,t,w.
That is, the content of a variable α, {α}c,g, is a constant function from circumstances to
g(α). The content, then, of a variable or an open formulae (or all expressions trivially) is
only given relative to an assignment function. So among the list of parameters that character
is a function from, we must include an assignment of values to variables. That is to say that
the assignment function is among the content generating parameters. We can understand
this, if we like, as the thesis that the assignment function should be included as a parameter
of the “context”. In fact, Kaplan (1989b) encourages us to do this.
9The formal system LD is presented in Kaplan (1989a), §XV III, pp. 541-553. In what follows I make
a few notational changes to ease the exposition.
10If we added the first person pronoun ‘I’, we would add the clause: JIKc,g,t,w = the agent of c. If we added
the modal operator ‘’ we would add the clause: JφKc,g,t,w = 1 iff for all w′ ∈W , JφKc,g,t,w′ = 1, etc.
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. . . context is a package of whatever parameters are needed to determine the
referent, and thus the content, of the directly referential expressions of the lan-
guage. . . Taking context in this more abstract, formal way, as providing the pa-
rameters needed to generate content, it is natural to treat the assignment of
values to free occurrences of variables as simply one more aspect of context.
(Kaplan (1989b), p. 591)
But whether we officially package up the assignment function as a parameter of “context” or
not, the general point remains that character functions—the functions that output contents—
require inputs, which include, in addition to an agent, a time, a location and a world, an
assignment of values to variables. Either way assignment-shifters operate on character and
thus assignment-shifters are monsters. That Kaplan’s LD is replete with monsters follows
directly from the observation that the quantifiers of LD are assignment-shifting operators
and the observation that character functions require assignments as inputs.11
4 Generalized quantifiers and lambda binders
Kaplan’s LD was put forward as a partial formal model of natural language—“a machine
against which we can test our intuitions”. If our best formalization of natural language
included monsters that would surely show that Kaplan’s monster prohibition was mistaken.
But LD was never put forward as our best formalization of natural language. One place
that it is clearly lacking is in its treatment of quantificational devices. Kaplan was more
concerned with formalizing the interaction of indexicals and intensional operators, than with
the semantics of quantifiers. In a more complete model of natural language he would, we
should assume, replace the old Tarskian quantifiers with more empirically adequate quan-
tificational devices. We do not treat the semantics of natural language quantification in the
style of predicate logic—natural language quantification is instead treated with generalized
quantifiers, where the assignment function does not even enter into the semantic clauses.
Why, then, does pointing out this relatively small quirk of Kaplan’s LD matter?
Here is why. Quantificational noun phrases, like ‘Every women’ are indeed not standardly
treated as assignment-shifting operators. Instead they are treated as predicates of predicates,
i.e. of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉. But that is not the end of the story. When employing generalized
quantifiers we still need a way to get from the value of a sentence to an associated predicate
value. That is to say that we need an account of variable binding. For example, consider the
following sentence, where the quantificational noun phrase occurs in object position.
(1) Eros loves every woman.
A standard way to treat this sentence is to suggest that its logical form differs from its surface
structure. It is instructive to consider how sentence (1) would be formalized in predicate
11To my knowledge the fact that Kaplan himself employs monsters in LD has never been argued for before,
although a related issue in terms of bound pronouns is discussed in Zimmerman (1991) (see especially §4.1).
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logic: ∀x(women(x)→ loves(Eros, x)). That is to say that it has the same truth-conditions
as the more stilted “Every woman is such that Eros loves her”.
Since ‘every woman’ requires an argument of type 〈e, t〉, but ‘Eros loves her’ is type t,
we need a way to get from the value of the sentence ‘Eros loves her’ to the value of the
predicate ‘being loved by Eros’. The common strategy is to introduce “lambda binders” into
the object language syntax such that when a lambda binder is prefixed to a formula φ the
complex expression takes on the value of a predicate.12
• J(λα.φ)Kg = λi.JφKg[α:=i]
In this way, the pronoun gets bound by the lambda and everything can proceed up the tree
via functional application.
(γ,t)
(e,t)
(γ,t)
Eros loves her1
((γ,t),(e,t))
λ1
((e,t),(γ,t))
Every woman
As is clear from the syntax tree the lexical entry for a lambda binder is given as follows:13
• JλαKg = λp〈γ,t〉.(λie.p(g[α := i]))
Lambda binders, then, are assignment-shifting devices. And that brings us to the general
thesis: variable binders, such as the quantifiers of LD or the lambda binders of compositional
natural language semantics, are monstrous.14 We needn’t look far and wide for the existence
of exotic monstrous languages, we need only look closer at the details of variable binding at
home. The monster prohibition, and the assumptions about compositionality and asserted
content that support it, must be reconsidered.
12See, e.g., Heim and Kratzer (1998), p. 186.
13I have never seen a lexical entry for the lambda binders but it seems fairly obvious and uncontroversial
that this is the way to do it. And I hope that some will find this explicit rendering of the semantics of
lambda enlightening.
14Importanly, one could make the same point with other examples of natural language variable binding (see
Partee (1989) for various cases). The arguement here does not essentially rely on the use of lambda binders
nor on a syntactic story about quantifier raising. For example, consider the type of binding concerend in so-
called binding arguments in Stanley (2000): an utterance of “Every bottle is green” in context might express
the proposition that every bottle in this room is green. But when “Every bottle is green” is embedded, e.g.,
in “In every room, every bottle is green” the quantifier domain variable is bound such that the utterance
expresses the proposition that in every room x, every bottle in x is green. So the variable binding operator
is monstrous.
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5 Reactions
I have argued that variable-binding operators must be understood to be monsters; and
this includes the devices used in a lambda-calculus-based semantics for variable-binding. If
right, not only does this refute the Kaplanian thesis that “directly referential” terms are not
shiftable/bindable, it suggests a natural model of semantical shiftiness which can be applied
to indexicals.15 Moreover, since monsters operate on entities that are distinction from the
assertoric content of their embedded clause, we have a straightforward and powerful argu-
ment for Dummett’s ingredient sense/assertoric content distinction (see Dummett (1973),
p. 447). But there are a few reactions to this discussion that suggest ways of avoiding the
conclusion or at least downplaying its significance. I will briefly discuss what I take to be
the most salient and interesting reactions.
Reaction 1. The assignment function is not strictly speaking part of the “context”, so
shifting the assignment is not strictly speaking “context-shifting”. Thus, an assignment-
shifiter is not strictly speaking a “monster”.
Response. This reply can take two forms. Either the assignment is construed as (i) part of
the circumstance (index) or as (ii) neither part of the context nor the circumstance (index)
(cf. Zimmerman (1991), §4.1). Kaplan cannot accept (i), since this would conflict with
the thesis that free variables are “directly referential”. This understanding would also be
committed to the questionable thesis that “what is said” (content) is assignment neutral (i.e.
propositions would be construed as functions from world-time-assignments triples to truth-
values). In other words, the assignment function would not be understood as a “content
generating parameter”, it would instead be understood as a part of the circumstance of
evaluation. For these reasons, it seems that Kaplan cannot accept this strategy. Nevertheless,
other theorists who do not share Kaplan’s commitments on “direct reference” and “what is
said” may find this option the most attractive. But if such a theorist does not agree with
Kaplan that the composition rules are defined over contents qua the objects of assertion, it
seems that they have already given up the spirit of the monster prohibition, which was the
idea that there are no semantic operations at a level of “meaning” more fine-grained than
the level of “what is said”. On the current approach, technically speaking, there wouldn’t
be operators on “character”, but characters also would not be functions that output “what
is said”. So as I understand it, giving up the thesis that sets of circumstances are assertoric
contents, and thereby making sets of circumstances entities apt for compositionality is merely
a way to accept the conclusion under a different guise.16
On option (ii)—where the assignment is construed as neither part of the context nor the
circumstance—we have to make a decision about the domain and co-domain of the charac-
ter functions. On the first approach, which seems to be the considered Kaplanian position,
15One can view Cumming (2008) as applying this strategy to proper names; and Santorio (2010) applies
such a strategy directly to indexicals.
16One might insist that compositional semantics should not concern itself with a notion of “what is said”
or assertoric content. If so, then I say so much the worse for Kaplan’s monster prohibition, since it is
fundamentally entangled with such a notion.
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“character” is a function that takes a sequence of parameters and outputs a content (sets of
world-time paris). On this understanding, character functions require inputs, which include,
in addition to an agent, a time, a location and a world, an assignment of values to variables.
Here assignment-shifting devices would be operators on character. One might insist that
monsters shouldn’t be understood as just any character operator but instead only the spe-
cial kind of character operators that shift the “strict context” (i.e. 〈w, t, p, x〉 without the
assignment g). First of all, this understanding has the awkward consequence that even if
variables—the paradigms of direct reference—are shiftable, such shifting devices wouldn’t be
“monsters”. Moreover, remember that Kaplan glosses his claim that there are no monsters
as the claim that all semantic operations are operations on content, so variable-binding,
which cannot be construed as operations on content, would seem to be deserving of the
pejorative “monster”. Especially, since it is still the case that in the semantic evaluation of
a sentence Σφ, the complement clause φ is evaluated with respect to a sequence of content
generating parameters c′ that is different from the sequence of content generating parameters
c with respect to which Σφ is evaluated. The second option with respect to the domain and
co-domain of the character functions is to diverge from Kaplan and modify the definition
of “character” to be a function from “strict contexts” to a function from assignments to
contents.17 But here again there would be semantic operations (variable-binding), which are
not operations on content (i.e. “what is said”) and this I think suffices to call such operations
“monstrous”.
Reaction 2. As the abundance of scare-quotes already makes clear, what exactly counts as
a “monster” seems to depend on a terminological choice. There are several characterizations
of monsters floating around: (i) monsters are operators that take characters as arguments,
(ii) monsters are context-shifting operators, (iii) monsters are operators that have semantic
effects on “indexicals”. So isn’t all this merely a terminological dispute?
Response. To some extent that is my point: The statement of the monster prohibition
requires some finessing. But it is not merely terminological. I think the driving force behind
Kaplan’s ban on monsters is the idea that the composition rules should be defined at the level
of assertoric content (or propositional constituents).18 If there are semantic operations that
don’t operate at the level of content, there is a good case to be made that such operations
count as monsters. Especially, since such an operator shifts the parameters on which seman-
tic interpretation depends in a way that alters the content of its embedded clause—since in
the semantic evaluation of a sentence containing such an operator its embedded clause must
be evaluated with respect to distinct sequences of content generating parameters. Although
there is no doubt an element of terminological arbitrariness here, in the context of Kaplan’s
article, I think the terminology is on my side. So I would displace the charge that this
17There is an analogous maneuver in Salmon (1986), where he re-defines “character” as the function that
maps a context to a function from times to contents.
18See Ninan (2010) and Rabern (forthcoming) for some recent critical discussion of the dogma that com-
positional semantic values are to be identified with the objects of assertion (of course historically there has
been an undercurrent of theorists who have gone against the dogma, most notably Dummett (1973), Evans
(1979) and Stanley (2002)).
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discussion merely makes a terminological point towards those who wish to avoid the conclu-
sion. The strategies above for avoiding the conclusion that variable binders are monstrous
are merely terminological: the substantive point that due to variable binding semantic com-
position must proceed at the level of character (or, at a non-content character-like level) is
not avoided.
Reaction 3. Strictly speaking, in the semantics that Kaplan provides (Kaplan (1989a), p.
545) the quantifiers do not “operate” on anything at all. The semantics, as given, provides
the interpretation of the quantifiers by means of a syncategorematic rule—a rule that says
“When you have ∀α followed by a formula φ, the interpretation of ∀αφ is such-and-such”.
In this case, there is no lexical entry or semantic value provided for the quantifier itself.
We should not assume that the syncategorematic rule is a mere abbreviation of a treatment
that involves a lexical entry—the syncategorematic rule can be understood to provide a
full treatment. Likewise, we needn’t provide a lexical entry for the lambda operators and
we needn’t provide a semantics of lambda terms that adheres to the rule of functional
application. In fact, to do so is nonstandard. Heim and Kratzer (1998) do not provide a
lexical entry for the lambda binders, instead they provide the syncategorematic Predicate
Abstraction Rule.19 If the semantics of variable binding, is understood to proceed via a
syncategorematic rule like predicate abstraction instead of a composition rule like functional
application, the thesis that variable binding is monstrous cannot even get off the ground.
Response. First note that a syncategorematic rule such as the following seems to be a
paradigmatic example of a monstrous semantics.
• JIn some context φKc,g,t,w = 1 iff there exists a context c′ such that JφKc′,g,t,w = 1.
But the definitions I provided actually don’t even apply, since the definitions I provided
were given under the assumption that the constructions at issue were compositional. I have
been assuming that the semantics of variable binding is determined by a compositional
process—and, in fact, I have provided lexical entries according to which variable binding
constructions come out as compositional (in both the Tarski-style and the lambda-calculus-
style frameworks).
So I concede that my thesis has a conditional element: The semantics of variable binding
is monstrous if (and only if) the semantics of variable binding is compositional. Of course
it is open for a theorist to insist that variable binding should be given a non-compositional
treatment. If variable binding is assumed to be evaluated by a non-compositional rule, then
there is no sense to the question of whether or not its semantic evaluation involves monstrous
mechanisms. The claim that a given linguistic construction is monstrous will only be true
(and really only make sense) under the assumption that its semantic evaluation proceeds
via a genuinely compositional rule.20 While I concede that my thesis is conditional in this
19Predicate Abstraction Rule: Let α be a branching node with daughters β and γ, where β dominates
only a lambda binder λx. Then, for any variables assignment g, JαKg = λz.JγKg[x:=z] (Heim and Kratzer
(1998), p. 186).
20See Pagin and Westerst˚ahl (2010) for a detailed analysis of when a rule is genuinely compositional.
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way, I’d like to present the following challenge to any theorist who is tempted to accept
my conclusion by denying my antecedent: Why should variable binding be handled by a
non-compositional syncategorimatic rule, when a straightforward compositional treatment
is available?21
Reaction 4. Kaplan treats free variables and bound variables very differently (just as he
does free and bound pronouns). For him, free variables are sensitive to the assignment func-
tion but bound variables are not. In “Afterthoughts” Kaplan says, “The case we are dealing
with here is the free occurrence of a variable in a premise or conclusion of an argument. Do
not confuse this case, the case with the interpretational gap, with the case in which a bound
occurrence of a variable appears free because we are focusing attention on a subformula. . . So
the rules for evaluating bound occurrences of variables are another story entirely, and an ir-
relevant one” (Kaplan (1989b), p. 592). So it seems that for Kaplan although quantifiers
may shift an assignment function, they would not shift the assignment function that free
variables are sensitive to—and so we have no reason to think they are monstrous.
Response. This indeed seems to be Kaplan’s position. It would also require a syntactic
distinction between two classes of homographic expressions in the langauge, e.g. ‘x’, which
only occurs free and ‘x’, which only occurs bound (on analogy with Kaplan’s claim that
“pronouns are lexically ambiguous, having both an anaphoric and a demonstrative use”
(Kaplan (1989b), p. 572)). In fact, an appeal to homography or ambiguity would suffice. But
why would one treat free and bound variables by means of separate semantic mechanisms, if
a single mechanism sufficed? Taking this idea seriously threatens to make Kaplan’s monster
prohibition true by the definitions of “free variable/pronoun” and “bound variable/pronoun”.
The claim is uninteresting if it is just the claim that free pronouns are not bound! So I concede
that there is a way to avoid the conclusion by, e.g., having two separate assignment functions,
one for the treatment of free variables and one for the treatment of bound variables. But I see
no independent motivation for this complexity. This points to an oddity in Kaplan’s whole
approach, namely his division of pronouns into “demonstrative” and “anaphoric” pronouns.22
Since it makes no sense to treat free and bound variables by means of a different mechanism,
in so far as the analogy between variables and pronouns holds, it makes no sense to treat
free and bound pronouns by means of a different mechanism. Once we see this it becomes
difficult to uphold a substantive prohibition of monsters.
21It’s unclear whether the motivation for Heim and Kratzer’s syncategorimatic treatment of variable
binding was done for merely pedagogical reasons or for some unstated theoretical reason. But I suspect
it was the former, since they are theoretically guided by Frege’s Conjecture (i.e. that semantic evaluation
proceeds via functional application). This seems especially likely since although J.Kg is not compositional J.K
itself clearly is compositional.
22Kaplan (1989a), p. 489 says: “[Pronouns] have uses other than those in which I am interested (or,
perhaps, depending on how you individuate words, we should say that they have homonyms in which I am
not interested)”.
11
References
Anand, P. and Nevins, A.: 2004, Shifty operators in changing contexts, Proceedings of SALT,
Vol. 14, pp. 20–37.
Cumming, S.: 2008, Variablism, Philosophical Review 117(4), 605–631.
Dummett, M.: 1973, Frege: Philosophy of Language, London: Gerald Duckworth.
Evans, G.: 1979, Reference and Contingency, The Monist 62, 161–189.
Heim, I. and Kratzer, A.: 1998, Semantics in Generative Grammar, Blackwell Publishers.
Kaplan, D.: 1989a, Demonstratives, in J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds), Themes
from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, pp. 481–563.
Kaplan, D.: 1989b, Afterthoughts, in J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds), Themes
from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, pp. 565–614.
Ninan, D.: 2010, Semantics and the objects of assertion, Linguistics and Philosophy
33(5), 335–380.
Pagin, P. and Westerst˚ahl, D.: 2010, Compositionality I: Definitions and Variants, Philoso-
phy Compass 5(3), 250–264.
Partee, B.: 1989, Binding implicit variables in quantified contexts, Proceedings of the Chicago
Linguistics Society, Vol. 25, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 342–365.
Rabern, B.: forthcoming, Against the identification of assertoric content with compositional
value, Synthese .
Salmon, N.: 1986, Frege’s puzzle, MIT Press.
Santorio, P.: 2010, Modals are monsters: on indexical shift in english, Proceedings of SALT,
Vol. 20, pp. 289–308.
Schlenker, P.: 2003, A plea for monsters, Linguistics and Philosophy 26(1), 29–120.
Stanley, J.: 1997, Rigidity and content, in R. Heck (ed.), Language, thought, and logic:
Essays in honor of Michael Dummett, Oxford University Press, pp. 131–156.
Stanley, J.: 2000, Context and logical form, Linguistics and Philosophy 23(4), 391–434.
Stanley, J.: 2002, Modality and what is said, Nouˆs 36(s16), 321–344.
Tarski, A.: 1936, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Studia Philosophica
1(4), 261–405.
12
Westerst˚ahl, D.: forthcoming, Compositionality in Kaplan style semantics, in M. Werning,
W. Hinzen and E. Machery (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality, Oxford
University Press.
Zimmerman, T. E.: 1991, Kontextabha¨ngigkeit, in A. von Stechow and D. Wunderlich (eds),
Semantik: ein internationales Handbuch der zeitgeno¨ssischen Forschung, de Gruyter,
Berlin, pp. 151–229.
13
